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Author Archive for natalie_meehan

Directors’ loan accounts – Common pitfalls and traps

By natalie_meehan · Comments (0)
Wednesday, April 18th, 2012

HMRC seems to regard directors’ loan accounts (DLAs) as a ‘risk’ area, in which there is the potential for errors. Such is HMRC’s concern that they have produced a ‘Directors’ Loan Account Toolkit’, which provides guidance on the errors that commonly occur. It also includes a checklist to help reduce them (seewww.hmrc.gov.uk/agents/toolkits/dla.pdf).

However,toolkits and checklists only offer general guidance. Practical issues and problems can arise in respect of DLAs for director shareholders of ‘close’ family or ownermanaged companies, three of which are outlined below.

1. ‘Bed and breakfasting’

One of the checklist points in the HMRC toolkit is: “Where an overdrawn loanaccount has been repaid, has the same or a similar amount been withdrawn in the subsequent period?” This refers to the practice of what HMRC refers to in its guidance (Enquiry Manual, at EM8565) as ‘bed and breakfasting’. It is broadly the practice of avoiding a company tax charge of 25% under the ‘loans to participator’ provisions (in CTA 2010, s 455), wherethe loan is repaid shortly before the charge arises (i.e. shortly before the endof the company’s accounting period, orjust within nine months after the end of theaccounting period). The director shareholder then withdraws the same or a similar amount shortly afterwards, making the loan account overdrawn again.

The guidance at EM8565 indicates thatHMRC will seek to establish the facts and evidence that repayment took place, and that the book entries reflect genuine underlying transactions. It also warns: “You should consider penalties for inaccuracies when a temporary repayment arrangement is successfully challenged. This could be because of the incorrect accounts where the bed and breakfasting occurred around the accounting date, on the grounds that the Balance Sheet was carelessly or deliberately misleading. Where the loan was on the Balance Sheet but was claimed to have been repaid within 9 months of the end of the accounting period there could be a carelessly or deliberately incorrect claim for Section 458 relief.”

2. Bonus and dividends

Many director shareholders of small or owner-managed companies regularly withdraw funds from the DLA for ‘drawings’, living expenses etc, resulting inthe DLA becoming overdrawn. A bonus or dividend will subsequently be voted to clear the overdrawn balance. If an overdrawn loan account is cleared by abonus, HMRC will often argue that the amounts withdrawn are payments on account of employment income, and seek to apply PAYE income tax and National Insurance contributions.

Penalties may also apply, such as for the late payment of those deductions. A potential solution to this problem is toclear the overdrawn loan account by dividends instead of a bonus. However, care is needed to ensure that thecompany law requirements are satisfied. For example, the dividend should be properly voted, paid and formally documented by minutes, dividend vouchers, etc. It is also important to appreciate when a dividend is treated as paid. HMRC’s Company Taxation Manual includes guidance on company law aspects of dividends (albeit that it is in some need of updating, for statutory references, etc), which states (atCTM20095): “In practice, a distinction is drawn between the final dividend and an interim dividend, (that is a dividend paid between annual general meetings). The Articles usually provide that: i) final dividends may be declared by thecompany in general meeting…and ii) interim dividends may be paid bydirectors from time to time…”HMRC states that a final dividend whichdoes not specify a future date for payment creates an immediately enforceable debt, whereas an interim dividend can only be regarded as due and payable when it is actually paid.

This analysis of interim dividends is based on case law (Potel vCIR, Ch D 1970, 46 TC 658). The meaning of ‘paid’ in this context can cause difficulties, particularly in respect of interim dividends. The HMRC guidance states: “In the case of an interim dividend (which does not create an enforceable debt and which can be varied or rescinded prior to payment), payment is only made when the money is placed unreservedly at the disposal of the directors/shareholders as part of their current accounts with the company. So, payment is not made until such a right to draw on the dividend exists (presumably) when the appropriate entries are made in the company’s books.” It adds: “If, as may happen with a small company, such entries are not made until the annual audit, and this takes place after the end of the accounting period in whichthe directors resolved that an interim dividend be paid, then the “due and payable” date is in the later rather than th eearlier accounting period.”

Care is therefore needed in the timing andpayment of dividends. If the director shareholder normally withdraws funds from the company in anticipation of dividends, consideration should be given to voting and paying the dividends in advance (say, on a monthly or quarterly basis), if possible. Where the director shareholder receives acombination of salary/bonus and dividends, it may be helpful to maintain separate loan accounts for each. If the director shareholder makes regular drawings on account, such payments could be taken from the loan account into which the dividends are paid. This should reduce the possibility of a challenge by HMRC on the basis that the amounts withdrawn are on account of employment income for PAYE and NIC purposes. It should be noted that HMRC considers separate loan accounts to be a ‘risk’ area in terms of the loans to participator charge in CTA 2010, s 455. HMRC’s toolkit on directors’ loan accounts states: “ensure each loan account balance is considered separately and s 455 tax calculated separately on each overdrawn balance”. Itadds: “separate accounts should not beaggregated or “netted off” for s 455purposes”.

3. Loan releases

Another risk area identified in HMRC’s toolkit is: “have any released or written offloans made to directors or participators been treated correctly?” Whilst the release or write-off of a loan to a participator triggers relief for the company from thecharge under CTA 2010, s 455 (see s458), it also results in taxable income for the individual on the amount written off or released, grossed up at the (nonrepayable)dividend rate of 10%. This income tax charge (under CTA 2010, s415) takes precedence over an employment income tax charge where (forexample) the participator (or associate) is also a paid director (ITTOIA 2005, s366(3)(a)).

By contrast, if the individual is a director or employee but not a participator, HMRC’s toolkit points out that the amount of loan released or written off is taxable as employment income under ITEPA 2003, s62 (i.e. the general employment income charge) or s 188 (‘loan released or written off: amount treated as earnings’). If the participator (or associate) is an employee, HMRC’s view is that “…theamount released or written off will attract aClass 1 NIC liability if it is remuneration or profit derived from an employment (Section 3(1) SSCBA 1992)” (CTM61630). If a director shareholder’s loan account isbeing released or written off in thecapacity of a shareholder, it must bemade clear (e.g. in company minutes and documentation dealing with the release or write-off) that this has been done in thatcapacity, instead of as a director/employee.  Otherwise, a Class 1NIC charge could result (see StewartFraser v RCC [2011] UKFTT (TC)).It should be noted that HMRC’s general approach to loan releases or write-offs is to treat them as ineffective unless made by deed (i.e. due to a lack of consideration for the release or write-off). In addition, a company deduction is not available under the loan relationship rules for the release or write-off of loans to participators (CTA2009, s 321A). However, consideration could be given to whether a business deduction is potentially available under general ‘wholly and exclusively’ principles.

Conclusion

There are generally more tax and NIC issues surrounding directors’ loan accounts than meet the eye, so care is needed. HMRC’s Directors’ Loan Account Toolkit, whilst general in nature, at least highlights some of those issues to consider, and provides an indication of risk areas from HMRC’s perspective.

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Anne Fairpo discusses CFC reform and IP

By natalie_meehan · Comments (0)
Wednesday, April 18th, 2012

CFC reform and IP

In order to reduce the risk of companies diverting profits overseas without good commercial reason, UK companies are subject to tax on the profits of their ‘controlled foreign companies’.  A controlled foreign company (CFC) is one which is resident outside the UK, controlled by persons resident in the UK – the reform of the rules removes the requirement that the company be in a lower tax jurisdiction than the UK, although there is an exemption for CFCs in countries with effective tax rates similar to the UK.

Control

‘Control’ is determined by considering the rights of the UK residents with an interest in the company, together with any rights held by persons connected with the UK resident. Broadly, a person will have control of they have power to secure that the affairs of the company are conducted in accordance with their wishes, where that power arises through shareholdings, voting power, or by the documents governing the non-UK company (ICTA 1988, s747 – being replaced with an equivalent provision under the current reform proposals in Finance (No 4.) Bill).

When do the new CFC rules apply to IP profits? Let-out 1: the gateway

Where an entity is capable of being a CFC, the profits have to pass a gateway test in order to be capable of being caught by the rules.  For an IP holding company, the relevant part of the test is Chapter 4, covering profits attributable to UK activities. The other parts of the gateway test relate to finance profits and captive insurance businesses, and so will be less relevant to IP businesses.

Chapter 4 will apply, so that the test is met and the profits are within the scope of the CFC charge for the UK shareholder unless one of the following four conditions is met.

The first condition is that the assets and risks of the CFC must not be held under an arrangement which has as its main purposes, or one of its main purposes, the reduction or elimination of liability to tax in the UK of another person, and the CFC expects its business to be more profitable than it otherwise would be.

The second condition is that the CFC does not have any UK managed risks or assets.

The third condition is that, if it does have UK managed assets and risks, then the CFC would be commercially effective even if it did manage the assets and risks directly.

The fourth condition cannot be met by a company whose business is the exploitation of IP, so it is not considered further.

It should be possible for a non-UK company holding intellectual property to meet one of these conditions so that the profits are outside the UK tax charge.

In particular, a CFC with appropriate substance should be able to have no UK managed assets and risks. One of the points of the new CFC rules is that they should not catch companies with appropriate substance and management in their local jurisdiction, even if that company pays little local tax. The key is to ensure that profits are not artificially diverted from the UK – HMRC are finally beginning to accept that businesses are not required to operate solely from the UK and that it is open to a business to move some or all of its operations outside the UK.

Let-out 2: Taxable profits

Where the gateway test cannot be met, so that the profits of the cell could fall within the CFC charge for a UK shareholder, the profits within the UK tax charge are calculated.  Excluded from those profits are profits from ‘trading income’, which will include IP profits unless the profits come from IP that was transferred to the UK within the previous seven years or so.  There’s no bona fide commercial exclusion, so it’s questionable whether this meets EU law requirements post-National Grid but, in practice, it means that profits from non-UK connected IP will be outside the CFC tax charge.

Let-out 3: exemptions

If the CFC fails the gateway test, and can’t exclude the IP profits, there are still a number of exemptions available. The principal exemption likely to apply to an IP business in this case would be the general exemption for CFCs with low profits; in particular, the profits of a CFC with accounting profits (or assumed UK-equivalent taxable profits) of less than £500,000 and non-trading profits of less than £50,000 will be exempt from the charge (proposed TIOPA 2010, s371LB following Royal Asset for Finance Act 2012).

Other exemptions

There are other exemptions which could apply but the main ones have a requirement that the IP not be UK connected, so companies that fail the second let-out above will probably fail to qualify for these as well:

IP holding company exemption

There is a IP holding company exemption (Sch 25A, PArt 2B, ICTA 1988, inserted by Finance Act 2011): this exemption applies, however, only for profits of a CFC whose sole business is foreign-to-foreign licensing of IP with a minimal UK connection.

The IP itself must have a minimal UK connection, which is to say that it cannot have been transferred from someone (related or otherwise) in the UK in the accounting period or the previous 6 years before the accounting period started.

Where the CFC itself creates (or subcontracts someone else to create) the IP, then the IP will not have a substantial UK connection, provided that the R&D was not done in the UK by a connected person or paid for by a UK connected person. The IP must also not be maintained or enhanced in the IP by a connected person.

In addition, the CFC itself cannot have substantial income from the UK (substantial is not yet defined), hence the focus on foreign-to-foreign licensing.

Excluded territories exemption

Finally, there is an exemption for CFCs in particular named territories – but this is subject to the same test for IP income as the taxable profits exclusion: it must not be derived from IP transferred by related parties from the UK in the accounting period or the six years before that.

Summary

The revised CFC rules provide a reasonable territorial exclusion for IP income from the UK tax charge on CFCs, with the principal issues being with IP that has had some connection with the UK in the last seven years or so.  It’s questionable whether the rules properly comply with EU law but, in general, it is a substantial improvement on the old CFC rules (which rather seemed based on the view that any non-UK IP ownership was tax avoidance).

Anne Fairpo

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Share loss relief – Satisfying the conditions for income tax relief

By natalie_meehan · Comments (0)
Wednesday, March 21st, 2012

It is probably a sign of the present hard economic times that more taxpayers seem to be seeking tax relief for losses on investments in shares and business loans. This is reflected in the number of cases reaching the tax tribunal.

Tax relief claims for losses against capital gains are prevalent. However, such relief generally only shelters gains at rates of up to 28%. By contrast, loss relief against income potentially provides income tax relief at rates of up to 50%, and is therefore the preferred route for many individuals.

The provisions allowing individuals to claim relief for losses on disposal of shares against general income (ITA 2007, ss 131-151) are subject to a number of conditions. For example, the shares must be ‘qualifying shares’, i.e. either shares to which enterprise investment scheme relief is attributable, or shares in a qualifying trading company which were subscribed for by the individual (ITA 2007, s 131(2)).

In Halnan and Squire v CRC [2011] UKFTT S80, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) disallowed the taxpayers’ claims for an allowable loss for 2004-05 (under what was then ICTA 1988 s 574), in respect of a close company of which both were directors. The taxpayers appealed.

The points at issue were whether the taxpayers were entitled to claim income tax loss relief in respect of the shares. The company ceased to trade on 31 October 2004, and a liquidator was appointed. Both taxpayers had agreed to provide £50,000 to the company at a meeting in May 2004. However, they were unable to produce share certificates, and there was no contemporaneous note of the meeting in which the share purchase was said to have been discussed, agreed and allocated to them. There was no record of the share purchase at Companies House, and the directors were unable to produce the company’s register of members.

The taxpayers argued that the affairs of a small private company are often conducted informally, and that the absence of share certificates and other evidence of shares being issued was not fatal to their arguments. The tribunal accepted that a subscription of the shares was discussed at a meeting of the company, and that the taxpayers each added £50,000 to the company. However, the burden of proof in respect of the shares was on the appellants. HMRC disputed that the appellants subscribed for shares for the purposes of ICTA 1988, s 574 (the share loss relief provisions), and stated that there was no evidence to support this.

The tribunal reviewed the available evidence. The taxpayers had acknowledged that shares would only be subscribed for the purposes of the share loss relief rules if the company had an obligation to issue the shares as a result of receiving the payments. A letter (from a consultant to the company) had been provided as evidence of what had happened at the above meeting in May 2004, but the tribunal considered that at most this only evidenced what two of the three company directors intended at the time (the third director was not present at the meeting).

The tribunal held that although they were directors of the company, there was no suggestion that they left the meeting committed to provide funds to the company, nor that the company was bound to issue further shares to them upon receiving payment, as certain other matters remained to be resolved, including the position of the third director and the raising of further funds required from third parties. The taxpayers’ appeal was dismissed.

Close companies

The taxpayers certainly had a point when arguing that small (‘close’) company matters are often dealt with on an informal basis. That has certainly been my experience of dealing with such companies over the years. Unfortunately, the lack of documentation such as board minutes or written agreements has the potential to cause difficulties, as illustrated in the above case.

HMRC cited the case National Westminster Bank PLC v CIR as providing guidance on what constitutes the ‘issue’ of shares (the inference being that shares are issued when allotted and recorded in a share register). However, that case concerned a public limited company. The tribunal in Halnan and Squire commented in the context of a small company. “We can see that a degree of informality is to be expected compared with say, the company whose shares were relevant in the Natwest case.”

The taxpayer had argued that Blackburn and anor v RCC [2009] STC 188 (an Enterprise Investment Scheme case) was helpful and relevant, as it considered the meaning of ‘issue’. The taxpayer in that case made a number of payments to a company. The Court of Appeal had to consider the status of those payments, and decide whether they were made for the allotment of shares.

The tribunal in Halnan and Squire distinguished the facts of that case on the basis that in Blackburn there had been a prior course of share dealing, and the taxpayer had taken advice from his accountant about making payment for the shares. However, in Blackburn the taxpayer’s initial payment to the company prior to the history of share dealing and before taking advice from his accountant was held not to be eligible for relief. The tribunal in Halnan and Squire considered that the payments had a similar profile to the non-eligible payment in Blackburn.

Thus if making a claim for share loss relief (or indeed any claim for relief) it is clearly important to ensure that there is sufficient evidence to substantiate the claim. Such attention to detail can easily be overlooked in the case of small, family or owner-managed companies, but could be crucial to a claim.

The legislation allowing relief for losses on the disposal of shares against general income can be difficult, depending on the circumstances. Attention to detail is important not only in terms of the company’s administration, but also in ensuring that the relief conditions are satisfied and a valid claim is made.

This article is accredited to Mark McLaughlin for the ICPA

http://www.icpa.org.uk/

Mark McLaughlin CTA (Fellow) ATT TEP

 

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Private residence relief

By natalie_meehan · Comments (0)
Wednesday, March 21st, 2012

The Capital Gains Tax (CGT) relief on disposal of an individual’s only or main residence is very valuable and well known. Taxpayers are generally aware of the need to reside in the property, which is a fundamental requirement for principal private residence (PPR) relief. However, what degree of permanence and continuity is necessary to qualify for PPR?

In Clarke v CRC [2011] UKFTT 619 (TC), HMRC raised assessments on the taxpayer, on the basis that he was not entitled to PPR relief in respect of two properties. Prior to purchasing those properties, he lived at the matrimonial home with his wife and two daughters. Following marital difficulties, he purchased a property (Property 1) on 17 July 2002, improved it and moved in with his eldest daughter. He considered Property 1 to be his PPR from the time of moving in (as soon as he completed on the property), and had acquired it with a view to permanently leaving the matrimonial home. He used a twelve month business loan from Nat West bank, as this was the fastest and cheapest route for him to raise the necessary funds.

The taxpayer subsequently developed land attached to Property 1. He obtained planning permission to build Property 2 on 15 November 2002. In order to raise funds to do so, Property 1 was put on the market in December 2002 and sold in March 2003. The taxpayer then stayed at his mother’s house. He started work on Property 2, and began living there in July 2003. In July 2005, his wife attempted to commit suicide, and he moved back to the marital home to protect his children. Property 2 was put on the market, and was sold in November 2005. The former matrimonial home was subsequently sold, and the taxpayer went to live in a converted house with his children.

HMRC submitted that at no time in the period of ownership was either of the two properties the taxpayer’s only or main residence. HMRC also argued that there was no intention to live permanently in either property, and no evidence had been provided to show any degree of permanence or continuity.

The tribunal considered the circumstances of the case, and found that when the taxpayer moved into Property 1 he intended to live there permanently. There had been a necessity to move out of the marital home. The twelve month business loan from Nat West had been the fastest and cheapest route for the taxpayer to raise the funds to purchase the property, and his intention was to sell the land attached to the house to pay off the bank loan. The tribunal also found it credible that after planning permission was obtained he decided to develop Property 2 himself, and accepted that he had to move back to the martial home after the suicide attempt by his wife. The tribunal held that the taxpayer was entitled to PPR relief in respect of the two properties, and allowed his appeal.

Permanence and continuity

When considering whether an individual potentially qualifies for PPR relief on the disposal of a dwelling house, HMRC appears to look at certain fundamental issues. Firstly, did the individual occupy the property as his or her only or main residence; secondly, if (s)he did reside in the property, was there a degree of permanence and continuity to indicate that the individual intended to occupy the property as his or her home.

On the ‘occupation’ issue, it should be noted that the PPR relief provisions allow certain ‘deemed’ periods of occupation, such as the last 3 years’ ownership. However, the dwelling house must have been physically occupied as the individual’s residence at some time during his period of ownership to qualify for relief. HMRC considers that an intention to occupy is not enough (CG64465).

With regard to HMRC’s ‘permanence and continuity’ requirement, HMRC appears to derive this requirement from (non-PPR relief) case law on the meaning of ‘residence’, and on the judgment in the PPR relief case Goodwin v Curtis [1998] STC 475. In that case, the taxpayer had only lived in a farmhouse for 32 days. It was held that he had not intended to occupy it as his permanent residence.

In the Clarke case, HMRC accepted in correspondence that the appellant resided at Property 1, but argued that he did not intend to live in either of the properties permanently. HMRC also argued that there was no evidence of continuity. Fortunately, the tribunal found in favour of Mr Clarke on this point.

HMRC will no doubt state that each case is based on its particular facts. However, the Clarke case suggests that PPR relief may be available after relatively short periods of ownership and occupation. Clear evidence of occupation and intention to reside at the dwelling house permanently should be gathered and retained, particularly in borderline cases.

This article is accredited to Mark McLaughlin for the ICPA

http://www.icpa.org.uk/

Mark McLaughlin CTA (Fellow) ATT TEP

 

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HMRC: Time to Pay

By natalie_meehan · Comments (0)
Tuesday, February 28th, 2012

Most tax professionals and many taxpayers will be familiar with the concept of ‘time to pay’ (TTP) arrangements with HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC). The basic position of HMRC is that tax is payable when due by law (note – the tax legislation does allow certain tax liabilities to be paid by instalments, but such instances are relatively uncommon). However, HMRC has some discretion (under a general responsibility of collection and management of taxes etc in the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005) to allow payment after the due date, in the form of TTP arrangements.

 

HMRC issued a ‘briefing’ in October 2011, ‘Giving taxpayers time to pay’ (www.hmrc.gov.uk/about/briefings/index.htm). HMRCs basic conditions for TTP are:

 

• HMRC is satisfied that the taxpayer is genuinely unable to pay their tax on time;

• The taxpayer can keep up with the payments they are offering to make;

• Other tax bills are capable of being paid as they arise;

• Any outstanding tax is paid off as quickly as possible

 

TTP arrangements will not be agreed solely to stop a business from going bankrupt, where HMRC is the major creditor and the business is relying on not paying its tax to stay afloat. Nor will HMRC agree TTP only to project jobs or a particular activity or industry.

 

Is that so?

 

HMRC denies that it has ‘tightened up’ on TTP. Instead, HMRC blames an increase in the proportion of TTP applications not meeting the above conditions, e.g. businesses which have had a succession of TTP arrangements, or which have failed to keep up the terms of previous arrangements. Refusals in 2011 (up to the end of August) represented 14% of total applications.

 

Despite HMRC’s claims to the contrary, there is anecdotal evidence that HMRC is taking an increasingly tougher line. Firms have outlined to me instances where HMRC has by-passed them as agent and contacted the taxpayer directly to pursue outstanding tax liabilities. I also recently queried with my local ‘Working Together’ group in Manchester whether HMRC is denying TTP arrangements where companies have a history of dividend payments (as had previously been reported on AccountingWeb). Whilst it was agreed that this matter would be ‘escalated’ to a higher level, HMRC has yet to reply or make any official announcement of its policy on this issue at the time of writing to my knowledge.

 

Official guidance

 

HMRC devotes a whole section of its Debt Management and Baking Manual to time to pay arrangements. HMRC generally seeks to distinguish between taxpayers who ‘can’t pay’ and those who ‘won’t pay’ – TTP arrangements may be extended to the former but not the latter. TTP arrangements typically span a few months or possibly longer (e.g. for business taxes), although TTPs lasting over a year are only agreed in “exceptional cases” (DMB800040). Interest will invariably be charged whether TTP is agreed or not.

 

Guidance on how HMRC distinguishes between ‘can’t pay’ and ‘won’t pay’ taxpayers is included at DMBM800050. In general, it is good practice before speaking to HMRC about TTP arrangements to read their guidance on the subject, and to ensure that HMRC’s staff adheres to their own guidelines without imposing further conditions for TTP.

 

Late Payment penalties

 

The HMRC briefing on TTP states that if an arrangement is agreed, HMRC will remove any surcharges or penalties that would otherwise have arisen, where TTP is agreed before any surcharges or penalties become due.

 

It should be noted that this treatment is statutory, not concessionary. Under the recently introduced penalty regime for late tax payments, the law requires that HMRC must suspend late payment penalties if certain conditions are satisfied (FA 2009, Sch 56, para 10) (Note – a similar rule applies in respect of the late payment surcharges regime applicable to tax returns up to and including 2009/10, where the TTP arrangement was made on or after 24 November 2008 (FA 2009, s 108)). These conditions are broadly as follows:

 

• The taxpayer must approach HMRC before becoming liable for the penalty;

• HMRC must agree to the ‘time to pay’ arrangement; and

• The taxpayer must adhere to the agreement and comply with any conditions of the arrangement.

 

If the taxpayer breaks the agreement (i.e. by defaulting on payment of the tax, or by failing to comply with any conditions of the time to pay arrangement) HMRC may impose the suspended penalty.

 

Mark McLaughlin CTA (Fellow) ATT TEP

 

 

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HMRC Enquiries

By natalie_meehan · Comments (0)
Tuesday, February 28th, 2012

Most tax agents involved with enquiry work will be familiar with the HMRC practice of ‘spreading’. This generally occurs when there is an agreed addition to the taxpayer’s income for the year of enquiry. HMRC will often seek to assess similar additions in earlier years, and sometimes to agree additions for later years as well. This is on the basis of a ‘presumption of continuity’, i.e. that the taxpayer’s default for the year of enquiry was continued in other tax years as well, unless there is evidence to the contrary.

 

HMRC points to case law in support of ‘spreading’ in its Enquiry Manual (see EM3310). Probably the most well-known of these cases is Jonas v Bamford [1973] STC 519. In that case, Judge Walton J expressed the presumption of continuity as follows:

 

“…once the inspector comes to the conclusion that, on the facts which he has discovered, Mr Jonas has additional income beyond that which he has so far declared to the Inspector, then the usual presumption of continuity will apply. The situation will be presumed to go on until there is some change in the situation, the onus of proof of which is clearly on the taxpayer.”

 

HMRC encourages its enquiry staff to use spreading where it is considered to be appropriate (EM3309). For example:

 

“…if you have proven omissions for which there is no ready explanation and the business and way of life of the taxpayer have not changed you will be in a much stronger position to argue for addition to other years.”

 

In addition to applying the concept of spreading to assess additional income for other years, it seems that HMRC will also seek to disallow expenses on a similar basis.

 

In Syed v Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 315 (TC), HMRC amended the taxpayer’s return for 2005/06 following an enquiry, and raised discovery assessments for the tax years 2001/02 to 2004/05 inclusive, and for 2006/07. HMRC sought to increase the taxpayer’s profits for 2005/06 as a dentist, not only in respect of unrecorded income, but also by disallowing certain expenses (e.g. repairs, legal and professional costs and interest paid). HMRC’s adjustments going back to 2001/02 and forward to 2006/07 were made on the assumption that the errors identified for 2005/06 had been repeated in the other years. The taxpayer’s appeals against the assessments were dismissed. The tribunal held that there was no evidence to suggest that the adjustments for disallowed costs were wrong (and there was also insufficient evidence that the additional income was not business income).

 

The decision in Syed is worrying, because it indicates that accepting (say) the disallowance of an item of business expenditure during the course of an enquiry will require careful thought, due to the potential for HMRC to apply spreading and seek adjustments in respect of other tax years.

 

Limitations

 

However, there have been indications that the presumption of continuity may be more limited in its scope than HMRC perhaps consider it to be. For example, in the Syed case the tribunal made the following comments about the application of the principle established in Jonas v Bamford: “In our view [the above quotation by Walton J] expresses no legal principle. It seems to us that it would be quite wrong as a matter of law to say that because X happened in Year A it must be assumed that it happened in the prior year.” The tribunal added:

 

“In practice it will generally be reasonable and sensible to conclude that if there was a pattern of behaviour this year then the same behaviour will have been followed last year. Sometimes however that will not be a proper inference: there will be occasions when the behaviour related to a one off situation, perhaps a particular disposal, or particular expenses; in those circumstances continuity is unlikely to be present.”

 

In addition, it should be noted that the Judgment of Walton J in Jonas v Bamford indicates that the presumption of continuity, on the basis of that case, applies to the future and not the past.

 

Back and forth

 

Backwards and forwards spreading was at point in Chapman v Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 756 (TC). In that case, the taxpayer appealed against assessments for 2004/05 to 2007/08. The enquiry year was 2006/07. In the absence of adequate business records, HMRC conducted a ‘takings build-Up’ exercise. HMRC considered that the retail price index should be applied to calculate the shortfall in declared income for 2004/05 and 2005/06, and the later year of 2007/08.

 

However, the tribunal noted that virtually all the evidence presented related to the period covered by the year of enquiry. With regard to HMRC’s takings build-up exercise, the tribunal noted that it was only an estimate, and held that the resulting turnover figure was “wholly unrealistic.” The omitted sales figure for 2006/07 was reduced accordingly. The tribunal also noted that a takings build-up was not produced for 2004/05 or 2005/06 due to “time constraints”, and commented: “…we cannot endorse such an approach in this case where the takings build-up relies on a number of specific transactions peculiar to the enquiry year”.

 

The tribunal added in the context of business economics exercises generally: “Where a capital statement is prepared for one year and sought to be applied to other years, they have to be adjusted to take account of exceptional items peculiar to the particular year. That was not done here”. The tribunal concluded that the assessments therefore could not stand, and that because there was no basis on which to substitute other figures, the assessments must be reduced to nil. Similarly, the tribunal held that HMRC’s takings build-up calculation for 2007-08 seemed arbitrary, and therefore could not stand. The assessment for that year was also reduced to nil.

 

The presumption of continuity was also considered recently in The Red Star v Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 812 (TC). In that case, following an into a partnership return for 2005/06, HMRC considered that there had been a suppression of sales and profit at the partnership’s Chinese takeaway restaurant business. HMRC adjusted the sales and profit figures for 2005/06 based on the quantities of rice used in the business. Applying the presumption of continuity, HMRC then adjusted the profits for all the other tax years from 2002/03 to 2007/08 to the same figure, subject to rounding, an inflationary adjustment and time apportionment for the final period of trading in 2007-08 of less than a year.

 

However, the tribunal was not satisfied that the presumption of continuity applied in the way that HMRC had sought to apply it. The tribunal considered that HMRC should have amended partnership profits for earlier years not by simply substituting an inflation adjusted figure carried back from 2005-06, but by applying the same methodology used in arriving at the 2005-06 figure, and assuming the same degree of under-declaration of both sales and purchases. With regard to later years, the tribunal commented that if proper partnership returns had been made for those years, the retirement of the senior partner during 2006 would have been sufficient to displace the presumption of continuity. However, as the partnership returns for 2006-07 and 2007-08 were estimated, the profit figures for those tax years were amended based on the revised 2005-06 figure, subject to an adjustment for inflation and time-apportionment for the cessation period.

 

Conclusion

 

Taxpayers who are subject to ‘spreading’ in HMRC assessments of additional income following an enquiry should be prepared to challenge HMRC’s calculations in appropriate circumstances, particularly where there is evidence to indicate that a presumption of continuity is not the correct approach based on the facts and particular circumstances of the case. Whilst the tribunal decision in Chapman offers taxpayers some encouragement it does not create a binding precedent, and further guidance regarding the limitations of the presumption of continuity would therefore be welcomed.

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Categories : HMRC

Loan relationships – When is a loan not a loan?

By natalie_meehan · Comments (1)
Thursday, January 19th, 2012

The loan relationships provisions for companies have been around since 1996, and it is fair to say that the legislation overall is complex. However, it is not normally difficult to identify a loan relationship for these purposes, although a recent case indicates that even this task may not be without its problems. The loan relationship legislation in FA 1996 was rewritten and is now contained in CTA 2009. It states that a company has a ‘loan relationship’ for corporation tax purposes if it is either a debtor or a creditor in respect of a money debt, and the debt arises from a transaction for the lending of money (CTA 2009, s 302).

HMRC guidance points out that not all money debts arise from the lending of money, such as trade debts (CFM31010). The same applies to directors’ loan accounts consisting only of undrawn or overdrawn remuneration etc. In the context of inter-company accounts, HMRC states that balances on such accounts may arise from the lending of money where one group member has borrowed from another (CFM31040). Money debts not arising from the lending of money are brought into the loan relationship regime (as ‘relevant nonlending relationships’), by treating them as such (CTA 2009, Pt 6). The term ‘transaction for the lending of money’ seems straightforward enough on the face of it. However, in MJP Media Services Ltd v CRC [2011] UKUT 100 (TCC), the taxpayer company (MJP) was a wholly-owned subsidiary of company C. Company C in turn was a wholly-owned subsidiary of company A. A series of intercompany transactions took place between MJP and company A.

A signed agreement stated that MJP had loaned a sum of money to company A, and provided for interest to be charged. A deed of waiver was subsequently signed, in which MJP agreed to waive most of the outstanding sum. MJP claimed a deduction in its corporation tax computation in respect of the waived amount. HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) disallowed the deduction claimed in respect of the loan relationship debit. MJP appealed.

Lending of money
The First-tier tribunal ([2010] UKPTT 298 (TC)) had to consider whether the intercompany debt arose from ‘transactions for the lending of money’ and was thus within the definition of loan relationship. The tribunal decided against the taxpayer company, which subsequently appealed. The Upper Tribunal noted that the Firsttier tribunal made the point that MJP had only disclosed four bank statements, which showed only a few of the relevant transactions. The witnesses had given “unsatisfactory explanations” for the failure to produce bank statements for the other transactions, and did not have firsthand knowledge of the transactions. Counsel for MJP defended the company’s inability to produce the necessary bank statements (notwithstanding the requirement to retain them for six years for VAT purposes), the witnesses’ lack of first-hand knowledge of the relevant transactions, the accounting documents (which the First-tier tribunal had regarded as incomplete evidence), and an inability to explain certain matters. However, the Upper Tribunal rejected those arguments. To prevail on the appeal, MJP needed to succeed in its arguments on all (four)  transactions.

The Upper Tribunal considered two of them, and agreed with the First-tier tribunal that the first transaction was not, on the balance of probabilities, a cash payment. The tribunal was not obliged to explain the transaction and why the same sum subsequently turned up in the books of company A. With regard to the second transaction, MJP had argued that company A had repaid £6.1 million to company C, that company C had repaid the same sum to MJP, and that MJP had paid company A the same sum. However, it was unable to explain why the transactions took place or how the transfers had been made, or show that cash payments had been made as opposed to transfers by book entry. It was held that the First-tier tribunal had been entitled to conclude that MJP had taken over company A’s debt to company C, in exchange for cancelling company C’s own debt, and that the transaction had been by book entry.

The Upper Tribunal also dismissed MJP’s argument that even if payments were
made by MJP to third parties on behalf of company A, that was sufficient to amount to “transactions for the lending of money”. The company’s appeal was dismissed.

The first hurdle
In practice, it is perhaps understandable to focus on how a loan relationship should be treated for tax purposes, particularly in view of the complex legislation in this area. However, the MJP case is a reminder of the importance of ensuring that a transaction falls within the statutory definition of a loan relationship to begin with. The case is perhaps unusual, in the sense that the taxpayer company could not produce banks statements for all relevant transactions, or provide other satisfactory evidence or explanations to support its arguments. However, it does emphasise
the general need to retain records and documentary evidence of transactions, not least because of a statutory requirement to do so in many cases (e.g. TMA 1970, s 12B for individuals, or FA 1998, Sch 18, para 21 for companies), and also where such evidence is important to the taxpayer’s claims or arguments.

Mark McLaughlin CTA (Fellow) ATT TEP

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Categories : Uncategorized

Private residence relief – Married couples ‘living together’ for CGT purposes

By natalie_meehan · Comments (0)
Thursday, January 19th, 2012

Married couples (and civil partners) benefit from favourable treatment for certain tax purposes. A common example is the ‘no gain, no loss’ capital gains tax (CGT) treatment for inter-spouse transfers (TCGA 1992, s 58). In addition, the inheritance tax spouse exemption is unlimited for transfers between UK domiciled spouses (although it is restricted to £55,000 if the transferee spouse is non-UK domiciled).

Living together
The principal private residence (PPR) rules for CGT purposes include a provision for married couples. It states that there can only be one sole or main residence for both spouses (or civil partners) so long as they live together (TCGA 1992, s 222(6)). In addition, any PPR election for their sole or main residence must be made by them both. The meaning of ‘living together’ appears clear and unequivocal on the face of it, but this will not always be the case. The term shares the same meaning as for income tax purposes (TCGA 1992, s 288(3)). The income tax legislation states that spouses and civil partners are treated as living together unless they are separated under a court order, or by deed of separation, or are separated in circumstances where the separation is likely to be permanent (ITA 2007, s 1011).

In Benford v CRC [2011] UKFTT 457 (TC), the tribunal had to consider whether the taxpayer had separated from his wife for PPR purposes. The taxpayer had purchased a property in his sole name, and later sold it at a gain. He claimed CGT relief on the property on the basis that it had been his principal private residence during a period of separation from his wife (it was common ground that she had never occupied the property). HMRC subsequently raised a CGT assessment under the ‘discovery’ rules in respect of the property disposal. The taxpayer appealed. The onus of proof was on the taxpayer to establish on a balance of probabilities that the property was occupied as his residence during the period he owned it, and that during this time he was separated from his wife in such circumstances that the separation was likely to be permanent. The tribunal said that whether the taxpayer occupied the property was a question of fact. Having considered the evidence, the tribunal found that he did indeed occupy the property during his period of ownership.

However, the tribunal also noted an absence of “convincing documentary evidence” to show that the taxpayer lived in the property, a lack of furniture and appliances there and a very small amount of electricity used. The tribunal held that there was not sufficient assumption of permanence or degree or expectation of continuity to turn such occupation into residence. In terms of whether Mr and Mrs Benford’s separation was likely to be permanent, the tribunal concluded that the taxpayer had not discharged the burden of proof required to demonstrate that he was separated from his wife in such circumstances that the separation was likely to be permanent. It was therefore held that he should be treated as living with his wife for CGT purposes. As mentioned above, TCGA 1992, s 222(6) provides that there can only be one residence or main residence for a husband and wife living together. As Mrs Benford had never lived at the property bought by Mr Benford, the matrimonial home was considered to be the taxpayer’s main residence. The taxpayer’s appeal was dismissed.

Conclusion

This case emphasises the need for taxpayers to provide satisfactory evidence to support claims or assertions in enquiry cases. The burden of proof in tribunal cases is on a balance of probabilities. The concept of ‘living together’ for tax purposes is not always straightforward, and can be counterintuitive. For example, if one spouse (or civil partner) is resident in the UK but the other is non-resident, they may still be treated as living together, assuming that they are not separated (Gubay v Kington [1984] 1 All ER 513, HL). Some care is therefore needed to ensure that a couple satisfies the statutory definition of living together in the relevant tax year.

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Categories : Capital Gains Tax, General Taxation

Ownership and tax issues – HMRC guidance on constructive and resulting trusts

By natalie_meehan · Comments (0)
Thursday, December 22nd, 2011

It is straightforward in most cases to establish an individual’s income entitlement for tax purposes. However, there are exceptions. HM Revenue andCustoms (HMRC) recently issued new guidance in its Trusts Settlements and Estates manual on the concepts of ‘resulting trust’ and ‘constructive trust’ for income tax purposes. These are ‘implied trusts’, which are created by operation of law, as opposed to ‘express trusts’ which a settlor normally creates expressly by trust deed.

Resulting trusts
A ‘resulting trust’ is a legal concept. It basically means that property reverts back to the settlor. HMRC guidance provides various examples of a resulting trust, one of which is reproduced below in the context of a joint saving account (see TSEM9620): Example “A contributes 100% of the funds in a saving account in the name of A and B. There is presumption of a resulting trust, whereby A holds 100% of the beneficial interest in the funds. A is taxable on all the income.” [Note – the example points to separate guidance in the case of property held jointly by married couples and civil partners (TSEM9800 onwards) which deals with the ‘50/50’ rule and the ‘form 17 rule’ and the specific tax legislation for spouses and civil partners in ITA 2007, ss 836–837.] It is presumed that the settlor had an intention that the property would revert back to him or her. However, HMRC accepts that this presumption can be rebutted, such as by the following:

(a) Gift or loan – if there is evidence to that effect;
(b) Other factors – if they show evidence that the ‘contributor’ did not intend to take an interest in the property;
(c) Express trust – such trusts can include oral trusts;
(d) Presumption of advancement – this mainly applies in the family context of purchases or contributions by (say) father for child or husband for wife (but not where a wife provides money for property for her husband) (Note – The presumption of advancement may be abolished from a date to be appointed – see Equality Act 2010, s 199).

The ‘presumption’ is that the husband/father etc intended the ‘advancement’ (i.e. the purchase or contribution) to be a gift. HMRC considers that further principles relating to resulting trusts may apply for income tax purposes in the context of land and buildings. Firstly, an agreement following the acquisition of property cannot give rise to a resulting trust, as it must be there from the outset. Secondly, establishing a resulting trust requires a direct contribution to the purchase price of the property at or from the date of purchase (e.g. cash, contribution to the deposit, mortgage payments).
Constructive trusts
HMRC’s guidance acknowledges that a constructive trust is a legal concept, which can apply in a non-tax context (e.g. home ownership by unmarried couples, or where a shareholder receives an unlawful dividend and thus holds it as a ‘constructive trustee’ for the company. In a tax context, HMRC states that a constructive trust arises where “…there is an alleged agreement or ‘common intention’ that the parties should share beneficial ownership of the property in some way that differs from the legal ownership or from the normal presumption of resulting trust, with the result that the income tax liability is not entirely on the legal owner.” HMRC provides the following illustration.

Example
“For example, A has legal ownership of property, but claims that A and B have an agreement that the beneficial ownership is to be shared 50/50. Or A has provided all the funds, but claims there is an agreement that the property is to be shared between A and B.” In the case of land, a disposal cannot generally be effected except by a signed document. The same applies to a declaration of trust in respect of land. However, this requirement does not apply to constructive (or resulting or implied) trusts (Law of Property Act 1925, s 53(2)). HMRC will require taxpayers to establish that a constructive trust exists, by considering the following questions (TSEM9710):
1) Was there an agreement or “common intention” that the parties should share beneficial ownership of the property? HMRC will require evidence that at the time of purchase there was an agreement or common intention that the beneficial interests should not follow the legal interest (e.g. Mr A is to be the legal owner, but beneficial ownership is to be 50:50 between Mr A and Mrs A). The agreement may be express or implied by conduct.
2) If so, did the parties act to their detriment (disadvantage) in reliance on that agreement or common intention or change his or her position? HMRC defines ‘detriment’ in this context as something which he or she could not reasonably be expected to have done unless they were to have an interest in the property, and considers that the detriment must be ‘significant’ (TSEM9730).
3) If so, what is the size of the beneficial interest to which the claimant is entitled? This will be a question of fact, but is not necessarily confined to looking at contributions towards the purchase price. HMRC will require taxpayers who argue for a constructive trust to present their claim as if it was being presented to a court of law (TSEM9750).

Capital gains tax
Resulting and constructive trusts are also potentially relevant in a capital gains tax (CGT) context. For example, private residence relief is available to trustees on the disposal of a property which has been the only or main residence of a person entitled to occupy it under the terms of a settlement (TCGA 1992, s 225). HMRC’s Capital Gains Manual contains further guidance on resulting and constructive trusts (at CG65415-CG65426). HMRC considers that a claim for private residence relief under TCGA 1992, s 225 is most likely to depend on the taxpayer establishing that there is a “common intention constructive trust” (for cases in England and Wales), by reference to nontax cases, Oxley v Hiscock ([2004] EWCA Civ 546) and Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17. More recently, in Kernott v Jones [2011] UKSC 53, unmarried cohabitants bought a house in 1985, and jointly owned it, without making any declaration as to how their beneficial interests should be apportioned. The relationship ended, and Mr Kernott moved out. Ms Jones had originally contributed £6,000 of the £30,000 purchase price, and the balance had been funded by an interest-only mortgage. Following the separation, Ms Jones continued to live in the property, and assumed sole responsibility for the mortgage and outgoings. Mr Kernott later demanded his half-share of the house. However, the County Court awarded Ms Jones 90% of the equity. Mr Kernott unsuccessfully appealed to the High Court. Subsequently, the Court of Appeal held that each party had a 50% beneficial interest in the property. However, the Supreme Court overturned that decision, stating that an initial presumption of joint tenancy in law and equity can be displaced if the parties changed their intentions, and that a court can deduce their common intention from their conduct. The land registry form (TR1) includes a ‘declaration of trust’ box. If it has been completed, HMRC will treat it as an express trust, which will be binding on the parties who make the declaration. Whilst this does not prevent a claim by a third party that there is a constructive trust, HMRC indicates that this may be difficult to establish, and illustrated this point in the following example (CG65420): “For example, a husband and wife buy a house and complete the TR1 showing that they own the property as tenants in common in equal shares. They allow their daughter to live in the house rent-free but she has to maintain the property and pay for the property insurance. When the house is sold the parents claim that they held it on constructive trust for the daughter. The fact that they declared they held the property on trust for themselves is good evidence that they did not intend to hold in on trust for anyone else. A constructive trust would have to arise later as a result of a fresh agreement or some further act of detriment by the third party such as a very substantial contribution to improvements. Such a later agreement would be exceptional.”

Taxpayers wishing to claim private residence relief under TCGA 1992, s 225 on the basis of a constructive trust will probably need to convince HMRC that two conditions were satisfied. Firstly, that there was a common intention that both parties (i.e. the trustees as legal owners and the beneficiary) would have an interest in the property (i.e. by express agreement, or inferred from their conduct). Secondly, the beneficiary acted to his or her detriment on the basis of that common intention (such that it would be inequitable to deny that interest). In the context of CGT relief under s 225, HMRC points out (CG65422): “When applied to TCGA92/S225 this means that the legal owners of the property will claim they held the property as trustees of a constructive trust under which a person occupies the property as a beneficiary of that trust. The legal owners will also be the settlors of the trust as they will have provided the property either by buying it so it can be occupied or by providing a property they already own. The terms of the trust will usually be that the beneficiary had a life interest in the property.”

If an individual uses his or her own money to buy an asset (e.g. a property) in the name of someone else, HMRC considers that a bare trust should generally be regarded as existing in favour of the purchaser (CG34400). However, if the other person is the purchaser’s wife or child, the purchaser will be presumed (in the absence of evidence to the contrary) to have made a gift to the wife or child. In the recent case Singh v HMRC [2011] UKFTT 584 (TC), four properties were held to have been bought and sold by the taxpayer on trust for himself and one of his brothers equally. The First-tier tribunal in that case made the following distinction between resulting and constructive trusts: “The Tribunal’s view is that, under a resulting trust, the interest held under trust must have been created at the date of acquisition of the property and, in the case of a constructive trust, prior to the property’s disposal.” The tribunal added: “A distinction must be drawn between resulting and constructive trusts when calculating the parties’ beneficial shares. A resulting trust only recognises the actual payments made. For a constructive trust there must be a finding of either an implied common intention resulting from a substantial contribution or an express common intention between the parties, of shared beneficial ownership in the property, plus an act of detrimental reliance on that intention by the party or parties not on the title. Only where such a common intention cannot be found can a resulting trust be inferred from financial contributions towards the acquisition of the property. If a common intention and thus a constructive trust is found, a court can ascertain the individual beneficial shares at its discretion.”

Conclusion
Whereas an express trust generally operates according to a trust deed, resulting and constructive trusts apply by operation of the law. Of course, HMRC guidance does not carry the force of law, and its approach may be called into question. Indeed, in the Singh case, the tribunal commented: “HMRC says that, ‘whilst an agreement could initially be made orally, it must be followed up in writing prior to the disposal of the asset’. No case law authority for this particular proposition was offered by HMRC and it is not one with which the Tribunal would necessarily agree.” However, an awareness of HMRC’s approach to implied trusts will be useful if seeking to demonstrate that one exists. The common thread running through HMRC’s income tax and CGT guidance is the importance of evidence where it is claimed that legal and beneficial ownership differs. Such evidence may include direct contributions to the purchase price, the payment of regularmortgage contributions, or possibly significant contributions by way of manual labour (CG65425). It may also be relevant whether (say) the legal owners of a property have made it clear (e.g. to banks
or mortgage lenders) that they own the property subject to an agreement that an occupier has an interest in it (CG65426). The onus of proof will be on the person who asserts that there is a difference between the legal and beneficial ownership to show how it differs.

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Categories : Capital Gains Tax, HMRC, Property Tax

Penalties and costs – The taxpayer fights back

By natalie_meehan · Comments (0)
Thursday, December 22nd, 2011

Taxpayers have recently been successful in a number of appeals before the tax tribunal on the grounds of ‘reasonable excuse’, mainly in respect of late filing penalties. One such case is highlighted below. In addition, the approach of HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in a case involving a discovery assessment was criticised by the tribunal, which awarded costs against HMRC. Perhaps a pattern is developing here – the taxpayer strikes back!

In The Executors of David Atkins (deceased) v Revenue and Customs [2011] UKFTT 468 (TC), HMRC had withdrawn a discovery assessment at a very late stage before an appeal against it was due to be heard. However, the appellants pursued an application for costs. The tribunal pointed out costs could only be awarded if HMRC had “acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings”. The deceased taxpayer had been a Lloyd’s ‘name’. Due to the way in which Lloyd’s activity is treated for tax purposes, it can be some time after the enquiry window is closed before a tax return can be finalised for a particular year. HMRC practice was therefore to open enquiries into returns, in order to keep Lloyd’s matters open. HMRC had guidelines for executors of Lloyd’s names to this effect, in connection with ‘Special Reserve Fund’ valuations and later adjustments to the tax return for the last period preceding death.

The deceased taxpayer’s agent had sent HMRC a letter reminding them to open an enquiry. However, no enquiry was opened. HMRC subsequently sought to make a discovery assessment, as this was the only way of assessing tax in respect of the Lloyd’s income following the closure of the enquiry window for the relevant tax return. Considerable work was undertaken by the taxpayer’s agent in preparing for an appeal against the discovery assessment.

The tribunal pointed out that, for a discovery assessment to be made, the tax return must be wrong in some way, and considered that the return was made in accordance with correct practice, in conformity with HMRC guidelines, and was absolutely correct. The tribunal judge commented: “The problem in this case results entirely from the way in which HMRC have themselves failed to act in accordance with their own guidelines in failing to open an enquiry into the relevant return.”

Penalties and Costs
The tribunal concluded that HMRC had forced the appellants to prepare for an appeal that involved considerable costs and no deserved merit. The Judge said: “HMRC have… been very unforthcoming to either the appellant or to me in admitting their fundamental errors”, and awarded the appellants their costs.

Excessive Penalty
HMRC’s actions were also criticised in Hok Ltd V Revenue and Customs [2011] UKFTT 433 (TC). In that case, HMRC sent the appellant company a penalty notice for £400 on 27 September 2010, in respect of late PAYE return forms P35 and P14, which were due by 19 May 2010. The penalty was calculated at £100 per month for four months. A further penalty notice for £100 was issued on 21 October 2010, as the returns had been filed on 15 October 2010. The company had been under the mistaken belief that the returns were not required because its only employee had ceased employment part way through the year. The company accepted that a penalty was due, but complained that if HMRC had notified the default sooner, it would have been remedied at a far earlier time, thus avoiding ongoing penalties. The company’s appeal was therefore based on the penalties being excessive. The tribunal considered that the company was entitled to rely upon the common law duty of a public body to act fairly in both its decision making process and the administration of its statutory powers. It stated: “We are in no doubt that such a body does not act fairly where it deliberately desists from sending a penalty notice, for four months or more, knowing that the effect will be to impose a minimum penalty of £500 upon somebody whose sin may be no more than oversight or forgetfulness.”

The tribunal noted that HMRC deliberately waits until four months have gone by and does not issue the first penalty notice until September in the year of default. Whilst appreciating HMRC’s stance that it had no
obligation to issue any reminder for outstanding returns, the tribunal had no doubt that “any right thinking member of
society” would consider that to be unfair and falling very far below the standard of fair dealing and conscionable conduct to be expected of an organ of the state.
here was no logical reason whatsoever for HMRC to delay sending out a penalty notice for four months. The tribunal said that it is no function of the state to use the penalty system as a “cash generating scheme”. The tribunal considered that “it would be a very simple matter for HMRC to set its computer settings so that a default or penalty notice was sent out immediately after 19 May in any year, instead of some four months later.” There was nothing fair or reasonable about setting a computer system so that it does not generate a penalty notice until the return was four months late, thereby ensuring a penalty of not less than £500. The tribunal held that HMRC had “acted neither fairly nor in a
good conscience”, and that no penalty was chargeable over and above the £100 penalty for the first month.

Conclusion

Both cases should give some taxpayers some encouragement to challenge HMRC’s behaviour and practices if they seem to be unreasonable. It will be interesting to see whether, following the Hok case, HMRC will change its practice about penalty notices for late returns and start issuing them sooner after the filing date.

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Categories : HMRC
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